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CIVILISATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AMONGST OTHER STRATEGIES 
John Blad 
Is criminal justice becoming more and more uncivilised and if so, how could this be explained?  Could 
it be related to the approach of the criminal justice system as an ‘assembly line’ that should produce 
punishments and effective crime control in the most  cost-effective way, dominated by an 
instrumentalist rationality, instead of viewing criminal justice as a normative system of checks and 
balances promoting the values of a purportedly democratic society within the rule of law?  If certain 
tendencies towards de-civilisation can be demonstrated, to what extent and how could the 
implementation of restorative justice then contribute to a return to more civilised criminal justice? 
Could re-civilisation of criminal justice by implementing restorative justice also contribute to reducing 
relapse into crime? These are the questions that will be explored in this  contribution, in an attempt to  
elaborate the intuition that restorative justice could function as a new civilisation movement for 
criminal justice.
1
 But not only restorative justice: other strategies can also contribute, as several other 
chapters in this book argue, and these strategies seem interlinked and could well be combined.  
1. Criminal justice and Civilisation 
It is highly plausible that the institution of criminal justice has contributed importantly to the 
civilisation of the populations of the European nation-states during the long process of state formation 
and, in this framework,  the construction and consolidation of the monopoly of violence of the central 
state.   Around 1800 all states became a ‘rechtsstaat’, ruled by law, with an important function for the 
‘legality principle’ that rules the functioning of the criminal justice system, thereby normatively 
controlling the exercise of state (or, sociologically more correct: collective) power.   
By effectively implementing this monopoly of violence an increasingly  large and stable social domain 
came into existence during this long process, in which citizens – increasingly protected by and 
subjected to the law – learned (because they were able to) to take account of each other’s needs and 
interests , not only in their relations as ‘legal subjects’ but also in socio-economic and other, private 
and public relations.  People learned to reckon with fellow-citizens in ever longer ‘chains of mutual 
dependence’, to be thoughtful of the consequences of their own behaviour for themselves and for 
others and to exercise self-discipline (Elias 2000:370-373).
.
Increasingly, the individual came to live in 
circumstances in which he learned to think about and foresee the consequences of his own momentary 
actions in the future, several steps ahead in the chain of interrelated actions and events:  enabled by the 
relatively calm and safe circumstances of life he was in.  Both the ‘psychogenesis’ and the 
‘sociogenesis’  of the civilised citizen are related with his development into a legal subject, secured by 
the monopoly of violence that was itself subdued to and controlled by the rule of law.   
Importantly, Elias observed that the citizen's self-control becomes  ‘dispassionate’ and models itself 
after the external processes of social control, which show an increasing differentiation of interrelated 
functions, producing a ‘dense web of interdependencies’ that seeks,  guards, balances,  counteracts and 
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prevents uncontrolled outbursts of (disturbing) affects.  In the situation without monopoly of violence 
the uncertainties and the unpredictability of events in life meant that one could indulge in ‘extreme 
cruelty’ (towards others) and in ‘extreme enjoyment of pleasures’: if one declined those attitudes there 
was the option of ‘extreme ascetism’ (Elias 2000: 373) .When these conditions of what Hobbes has 
termed the natural state slowly disappeared by the establishment of the monopoly of violence, the 
pacified war or all against all was transformed in a permanent internal struggle to control the types of 
passions, which would naturally resist such control (drive-satisfaction versus drive-control) (Elias 
2000: 375).
.
In his Freudian analysis Elias defines a successful individual civilisation as a pattern of 
conduct that on the one hand responds to the functional expectations that adults are confronted with (in 
the societal chains of mutual dependence), offering  on the other hand sufficient personal satisfaction 
of needs. The civilizing processes of socialisation  in which the human comes into being are however 
never complete, nor permanently effective, and  egocentric affects can and will often be indulged in at 
the cost of others. When the legislator has foreseen this possibility and considered the consequences 
unacceptable,  penal consequences can be imposed on the basis of penal law provisions. On the 
grounds of the legality-principle thoughtful legal subjects can foresee this and in this way the legality-
principle not only limits and controls the exercise of state power (its normative function) but also 
potentially informs and shapes  behavioural choices to be made by legal subjects.  This criminal-
political function provides the criminal law with a certain, although limited,  instrumental value. This 
dual functionality (of the legality-principle) characterizes all other key principles of the classical 
criminal law which began to reign in Europe soon after 1800: equality before the law,  personal 
responsibility(internal and external) publicity, proportionality and finally that of subsidiarity (ultima 
ratio). These all made criminal justice more predictable, more equal, more controlled and moderate 
and at the same time more functionally effective (Dupont 1979).
.
Torture (to obtain confessions) and 
secret penal procedures disappeared in the context of doing justice publicly, with both more impact 
and more accountability to the public, but also corporal punishments  and other excessive and highly 
dysfunctional punishments, such as the declaration of  ‘civil death’  and the general confiscation of all 
possessions of the culprit – and also of his dependants– were abolished.  The punishment of 
imprisonment began slowly to drive out the death penalty, but the general and cultural developments 
also brought a certain moderation in the use and execution of this custodial punishment. In penological 
terms there was the moderating influence of classical retributivism that focussed on administering the 
punishment in proportion to the degree of individual guilt and the degree of severity of the crime. 
Particularly in the Netherlands this moderating effect seems to have been quite strong, probably above 
all influenced by the catholic, and later more humanistic and existentialist views of the famous 
‘Utrecht School’, which could explain why the Netherlands had the world record lowest (relative) 
prison-population in the 1970s (Van Ruller 1986).
.
Utilitarianism brought along a predominant focus on 
rehabilitation and re-integration of convicts as useful and productive members of society, which 
contributed in its own way to moderation and avoidance of excessive severity of punishments. 
Influenced by developments in anthropology conditional sentencing was introduced:  the conditions 
imply alternative types of sanctioning, which were recognized as valuable ways of avoiding the social 
and economic costs of imprisonment,  when this punishment is not absolutely inevitable. 
Differentiation of penal regimes for juveniles and offenders with serious mental problems made 
criminal justice potentially both more humane and subtle and more effective.  
One can conclude from this introduction that in the civilising social networks of interdependence, 
there is a high degree of differentiation of mutually dependent functions and a similar complexity of 
interwoven chains of reciprocal dependence.  This makes it necessary to be  thoughtful, prudent and 
careful, decisional attitudes which are facilitated by the ability to take a distant (excentric) view of 
these networks and chains and through awareness of one’s own place and functions in them.  
2. The incremental loss of civilisation in criminal justice today 
Norbert Elias’ analysis concerns a process spanning many centuries in which the developments were 
not permanently nor unequivocally progressive, but sometimes they were predominantly or partly 
regressive.  Still the unplanned result in the long run was that of an enhanced level of civilisation. 
If we want to suggest in this chapter that there may be a regressive tendency in the level of civilisation 
in actual criminal justice practices we can only search for indicators of such a development, because 
interpreting developments in which one is deeply immersed in one’s own lifetime is much more 
hazardous than interpreting historical processes.  One can only try to ground one's intuitive analysis on 
the relevant documentary evidence  one can find, perhaps overlooking other processes that take place 
at the same time. What is presented here is however not a subjective, but at least an inter-subjective 
analysis, based on contemporary writings of various professionals witnessing the same tendencies.  
Mindful of Elias’ analysis a loss of civilisation (in criminal justice) should be seen as a process of a 
broader, societal, socio-economic and cultural nature that is expressed and manifests itself in the 
contemporary uses of criminal justice. What is contended is not that there are inherent, immutable 
characteristics that might get lost or are endangered by internal changes in criminal justice itself  (the 
institutions of law are no agents), but that there are wider and continuing processes which produce a 
certain degree of rough and toughness  and induce  an inclination to stress certain functions of criminal 
justice, such as its capacity to punish, at the cost of other functions such as offering individual suspects 
protection against the power of the social collective, exercised through the state. Substantively one 
could think of the degree in which doing criminal justice is still based in thoughtful, prudent and 
careful consideration, in the context of an institutionally guaranteed, distanced  (and dispassionate) 
deliberation of all interests which are at stake when using the state’s monopoly of violence. To what 
extent have there been developments that have changed or even undermined the checks-and-balances 
between the agencies of criminal justice (the legislator included) and to what extent has this given rise 
to a situation in which criminal justice can no longer be an institutional brake on spontaneous 
outbursts of cruelty and excessive harshness, but to the contrary a way of forcefully expressing these  - 
more or less collective - affects? 
In the Netherlands, a country that was formerly famous for its humane and lenient penal system, some 
developments which are alarming in this regard can be discerned. Especially giving rise to concern is 
the fact that in the recent decades the traditional distance between the politically responsible minister 
of justice and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) – which always served well to prevent a 
politicisation of everyday justice – expressed in the ‘doctrine of the velvet glove’ has been replaced in 
1999 by an explicit power of the same minister to give instructions with regard to every task and 
(legally mandated) power of the Public Prosecution Service (Blad and De Doelder 2008).
 2
  Since the 
minister himself is accountable to parliament this has enabled the traditionally feared, but now desired  
politicisation of doing justice, which expresses itself in unlimited meddling by politicians in any 
criminal event that is covered by mass-media, creating and amplifying an impression that criminal 
justice is massively failing to perform its purported main function, namely crime control (and that 
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politicians themselves of course know better what to do). Another landslide that has happened in our 
criminal justice system is that the public prosecution service has been given an autonomous power to 
impose punishments (‘penal dispositions’ which may not imply custodial sanctions) (Hartmann 2008). 
This competence of the PPS to punish will in the near future replace most of the formerly consensual 
settlements between the PPS and the suspect, the so-called ‘transactions’, to avoid prosecution on 
certain agreed conditions such as  compensating the victim. The initiative to address an independent 
court now has to be taken by the citizen who faces a punishment already imposed by the PPS: 
therefore he should oppose the decision by default. This new procedural arrangement has in this 
context two relevant consequences: the first is that the everyday sanctioning levels in a massive 
amount of cases can be directly steered by the minister of justice (in view of the latter's unlimited 
power to instruct the PPS). And the second is that the independent courts tend to be marginalised in 
determining what justice implies in very frequent incidences of crime, dealt with routinely by the 
prosecution service. The power of the PPS will be increased and that of the courts decreased  further 
when the mandatory minimum sentences that have been proposed will become law
3
: the courts will 
then, under normal circumstances, not be able to escape the duty to impose the mandatory sentences 
(50% of the maximum penalty), but the PPS has the power to  decide to bring a criminal charge that 
does, or does not imply a legal construction of the putative offence that would oblige the courts to 
impose a mandatory sentence upon conviction (De Doelder 2011).
.
 
The system’s internal capacity to discuss and consider prudent action in doing criminal justice  is  
undermined by these developments. In this regard it should also be mentioned that,  while the limits of 
substantive criminal law are drawn ever wider, become more vague and sometimes even imply the 
liability to be punished for mere (ascribed) intentions, the criminal procedural law is to a certain 
degree de-formalised, leaving it to the courts e.g. to decide what should be the legal consequences of 
serious flaws – and even transgressions - in the preparatory investigations by police and PPS. The 
legal scholar Mevis has interpreted this as signs of a ‘withdrawing legislator’–  letting the courts down 
by weakening the legal sources of legitimacy of  the courts' verdicts  (Mevis 2008)
.– but it is much 
more appropriate to see these developments in legislation as conscious and purposive action of the 
legislator, facilitating political steering of criminal justice much more effectively than strict legality 
would.
4
  As noticed by the legal scholar Klip (2010:588) 
.
, by the ever increasing power to punish the 
necessity to make choices and set priorities in law enforcement becomes also greater and more urgent, 
because it is impossible to react to each and every (putative) offence, but these choices are no longer 
made in transparent legislation, grounded in a democratically open and public debate,  but in the  
everyday decisions about investigation and prosecution, hidden from the public view.  
3. Penal instrumentalism 
These developments in the Netherlands can be interpreted as evidence of the increasing 
instrumentalisation of criminal justice since the middle of the 1980s, which has been analysed and 
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4
 For the attentive reader of Dutch professional literature on the functioning of criminal justice the signs of 
political steering of legal action are many. Recently Stevens (2012) demonstrated the strong influence of 
‘risk-management’ on decisions about the use of  pre-trial detention: all legal aspects that should be weighed 
by judges are in daily practice overruled by one political necessity: to avoid any risk. 
criticised by the legal scholars A.C. ’t Hart and R. Foqué (1990a)  as a fundamental problem in the 
context of a modern relational theory of law.
.
 In this relational approach law should provide and guard  
the foundations of a democratic state under the rule of law as a model for a balanced society, 
orientated towards the realisation of equality, equal liberty and equal opportunities for participation of 
all legal subjects. Quoting  A.C. ’t Hart (2004:210), the founding fathers of modern rule of law were 
searching for:  
‘ a construction [meaning ‘ structure’  ,jrb] in which power would be divided between 
participants who acknowledge each other reciprocally and wherein law would function in the 
first place as the structure constituting the relations between in the participants in power. Law 
is then not a pure instrument of the exercise of power, but is understood as a pattern of 
relations (…) expressing a comprehensive structural equilibrium  that allows limitation  and 
diffusion of the exercise of power.’.(My translation, jrb)  
On this view,  in as far as law can be an instrument, it is an instrument only for the preservation of the 
comprehensive equilibrium in the long run. It does so by maintaining  the  ‘counter-factual’  legal, 
aspirational model of the democratic rule of law as expression of an ethical-political  ideal, wherein 
the rights and liberties of each legal subject are equally protected , both in his horizontal legal relations 
to  fellow-citizens and in his hierarchical legal relations to government and authorities. From this 
legally guaranteed position all legal subjects can participate freely in public debate about the fabric of 
society and the polity of the state. 
Instrumentality of and protection by law are in this view inseparable:  protection by law is 
instrumental.
.
But it is a kind of instrumentality that transcends the short-term political aims, interests 
and practices, which should normatively be limited by legal policies geared to the long term balances. 
Very different from this kind of instrumentality is the ‘penal instrumentalism’ that has become 
predominant in the last 25 years in criminal justice policies. Penal instrumentalism places effectivity of 
law in combatting crime as sole priority and inherently views provisions of legal protection of citizens 
against state powers as  obstacles that should be removed as much as is (constitutionally) acceptable 
(Foqué and ‘t Hart 1990b: 194)..The realisation of short term political aims should be smoothly 
facilitated with the means of criminal justice, conceived as and reorganised to be an assembly-line of 
the politically desired  output, instead of an autonomous system of checks and balances  that imposes 
limits on political programs and agendas.  
Penal instrumentalism could be defined as ‘ 
the tendency to overlook and overstep the inherent limits of penal instrumentality (that is the 
limited capacity to reach certain aims with the means of the penal law), which leads to an 
incremental weakening of the legal protection of individual citizens against oppressive 
tendencies in society and the powers of state authorities.(Blad 2008:38).
5
 
Analytically  two types of limits are being overstepped. Firstly there are the functional limits inherent 
in the capacity to achieve certain goals by means of the penal law: as a means of influencing conduct 
in the direction of ‘norm-conformity’ , the threat and imposition of punishment  only have a very 
limited efficacy.  This depends upon various personal and societal (educational, socio-economic, 
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6
  These limits are 
increasingly disregarded.  The concept of inherent limits to the capacity of the penal law to achieve 
certain aims implies that to overstep these limits produces no positive results (no surplus value in 
terms of reducing crime-levels) but merely implies more costs in terms of loss of rights and liberties. 
The latter is caused by the transgression of the second type of inherent limitations, the ethical-
normative limits which  – in the relational theory of law used here - follow from the social contract as 
the foundation of state and civil society and of the legality-principle ruling the exercise of power: 
predominantly the safeguarding of privacy, personal life and human equality.  The one-sided  stress on 
combatting, not only crime but now also issues of nuisance and even mere feelings of unsafety (often 
without much objective reason) leads to an increasing number of invasive powers of the criminal 
justice agencies, foremost the police, many of which are called ‘preventative’ but are in fact of a 
repressive character. Examples are the so-called ‘preventative search’7 and the obligation to be able to 
show an ID when required, which can be at any occasion in public. Other examples are invasive means 
of investigation and detection such as systemic electronic surveillance of private homes and 
communications.  
While these invasive powers of the criminal justice agencies  are increased and more frequently used, 
their use is becoming more and more selective, informed and directed by social and political 
discourses negatively stereotyping certain sections of the population as the source of  our crime 
problems. Although the (most often marginalised) sections of the population that are under popular 
attack vary fashionably in time,  the politically exploited repressive talk, distributed and amplified by 
the mass-media,  prepares the population at large continuously for new invasive powers and repressive 
interventions in a dramatic projection of a moral battle of ’us against them’.  Groups that have been 
socially constructed as our enemies are various ethnic minorities ('Antillians', 'Maroccan youth', 
'Gypsies’), ‘Street-terrorists’ (which are groups of youngsters causing ((serious)) nuisance) and 
nowadays f.i.Polish workers and motor-cycle clubs such as, or resembling  the Hells Angels.
8
  Typical 
for this era is that politicians do not any more dissociate themselves from these social constructions of 
‘folk devils’ or try to neutralise them – as they would have done until the 1980s – but accept them as 
images, feelings and desires that the population has a right to maintain (Hallsworth 2000).
.
Penal 
instrumentalism is framed in and framing the development of a predominant ‘culture of safety’ , that 
projects and seeks to protect a majority of presumably law-abiding, well-integrated citizens against 
less integrated and relatively more deprived groups, perceived as the source of criminal risks and 
danger (Van Swaaningen 1997).
. 
In result, instead of promoting a democratic society of equals this use 
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of criminal justice merely reproduces and reinforces the structure of inequality and relative deprivation 
at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder (Frehsee a.o. 1997). 
David Garland's analysis (1996; 2001) of the waning of ‘penal welfarism’ and the gradual 
development of a culture of penal control, indicated a.o.by the decline of the rehabilitative ideal and 
the political exploitation of fear of crime and a re-dramatisation of crime against which the public 
must at all costs be protected, was based on the USA and the UK but is very applicable to the 
developments in the Netherlands, even more so since 2001, the year of publication of his book.  
Especially the discovery of the symbolic figure of the victim as a source of legitimacy for penal 
control developed in the Netherlands only after 2001. Penal instrumentalism is based on populism and 
coupled with  managerialism, leaving less and less room for professional discretion in doing justice. 
Not only scientific expert knowledge, but also legal professionals are politically ‘denigrated’, as 
Garland correctly observed (2001:13), and public opinion serves as the privileged, almost exclusive 
source of political discourse and crime policies.   A prominent explanation in penal sociology for the 
drastic changes in the penal climate in so many western countries is the thesis that complex and 
interrelated technological, socio-economical and cultural changes in connection with globalisation 
have undermined traditional certainties and forms of (informal) social control. While situational and 
informal social control mechanisms have been weakened the increasing wealth and mobility has 
increased opportunities for criminal activity. Also in the Netherlands a strong increase in recorded 
(property) crime in the 1970’s has produced a legitimation-crisis for the nation state, that derives a 
great deal of its legitimacy from the capacity to protect its subjects against crime. Politicians and 
policymakers have responded by adapting the criminal justice system in order to make it a seemingly 
more efficient system of crime control, with an increasing emphasis on deterrence and incapacitation 
by longer terms of imprisonment. But what is most striking is that the criminal justice system is still 
made more severely punitive now, while overall registered crime levels are decreasing. Management 
of fear seems to be an overriding political aim here (Van de Bunt and Van Swaaningen 2004; Van 
Swaaningen 2009), and it seems to induce an acceptance of undue harsh punishment and control levels 
on offenders, which will now be discussed as an indication of de-civilisation. 
4. Conditions and expressions of harshness 
Referring to the increasing punitiveness of criminal justice in the USA Jonathan Simon has suggested 
that there seems to be a growing acceptance of an ‘entitlement to cruelty’. Cruelty is defined by him as 
the  
‘trend towards penalties that are painful, vengeful, and destructive for life chances. By cruelty 
I also mean to foreground a feature of the public presentation of these penalties as something 
more than a belief in the necessity of harsh punishments to provide some crime control 
benefit, or even to satisfy some philosophically abstracted notion of retribution. By cruelty I 
mean satisfaction at the suffering implied by, or imposed by, punishment upon criminals, as 
well as emotions of anger and desire for vengeance taking violence’ (Simon 2001: 87).. 
The cruel forms of punishment that Simon discusses are the death penalty (defended nowadays also as 
offering the victim or bereaved relatives the possibility of ‘closure’), the ever increasing lengths of 
terms of imprisonment (even for relatively small third offences  under “3-strikes” legislation) which he 
interprets as  ‘life-thrashing sentences’ , and the wide scale of different sanctions aimed at ‘shaming’, 
such as uniformed work in ‘chain gangs’.   
Tendencies towards public shaming are not very strong as yet in the Netherlands, but recently it has 
been suggested that offenders sentenced to a community sanction should carry out their community 
work wearing brightly-colored jackets with words printed on them indicating that this work is done for 
punishment.
9
  More disturbing is the tendency to impose ever longer terms of imprisonment, the 
unprecedented rise in life-imprisonment and the announced introduction of mandatory sentencing in 
cases of recidivism, involving crimes causing an infringement on the personal integrity of the victim, 
within a ten-year time span after a previous conviction. All institutional advisory boards in the 
Netherlands have rejected this proposal on grounds of professional legal and scientific critique, but the 
bill has been introduced anyway, with even more severe provisions. The serious and deep conflicts 
between the professional legal elite – most particularly judges, now announcing forms of civil and 
legal disobedience – and populism that have been developing in the last two decades in the 
Netherlands seem to culminate into a drastic fettering of the courts in their traditional power to 
determine sentences on the grounds of individualized considerations of the offence, the offender and 
the circumstances of the case.   
The sociologist Boutellier (2002:111 a.f.; 2004) perceives a development towards ‘urgent criminal 
justice’ (as opposed to criminal justice as ultima ratio), predominantly geared to deterrence and 
selective incapacitation,
,  
but the legal scholar Professor Klip (2010: 592) speaks more sharply of a 
tendency towards ‘total criminal justice’:  ‘a justice system with severe punishments that have to be 
applied always and everywhere’, implemented by a political elite that is only interested in the punitive 
aspect of the justice system, but not in the legal aspects of it and that would preferably make the courts 
redundant.
. 
From the advanced and subtle system based on personal culpability the Dutch legislator is 
slowly turning back to the medieval system of  offence-oriented  justice in which only the abstract 
severity of the crime is relevant. Another legal scholar, Professor Groenhuijsen, discussing a 
legislative initiative taken by the very right-wing populist party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid: PVV),  
concludes that this initiative involves a party-political programme encompassing  the ‘complete field 
of criminal justice’, most strikingly without any  relevant substantial justification and explanation:  
‘Drastic increases in maximum penalties across the board,  the introduction of severe and 
sometimes towering minimum penalties, the corruption of the foundations of juvenile justice 
and the application of preventative detention in many, many categories of 
offences’(Groenhuijsen 2010: my translation, jrb). 
.
A younger academic, Claessen (2010: 100), and a group of his colleagues observe  an ‘unprecedented 
punitive climate and austerity of penitentiary law’.. The penitentiary specialist Emeritus. Professor 
Kelk, in an overview of developments,  unreservedly notices a clear regression ‘from humane to hard-
hearted’.. 
Jonathan Simon tries to explain the apparent change of mentality, already noticed by Garland, that 
expresses, promotes and accepts the need for satisfaction by cruel, vengeful punishments, in two 
different ways. Firstly he wonders whether the evolution from mechanical towards organic solidarity, 
as proposed by the famous sociologist Durkheim, could be in reverse now:  
‘The bloody rituals of the scaffold reflected the characteristics of the conscience collective 
under mechanical solidarity. Under conditions of organic solidarity justice is increasingly 
reconceived as restitutive. There is less intense collective emotion and what there is valorizes 
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things like individuality, rationality and choice, which mitigate against cruelty’(Simon 
2001:97) .
. 
In the postmodern conditions of globalisation and de-industrialisation it appears likely to him, that the 
newly emerging cruelty is one of the ways to produce ‘neo-mechanical solidarities’. In this regard he 
mentions the street-culture of various  youth-groups coming from the lowest socio-economic classes,  
but also the fact that many of the Californian supporters of the ‘3-strikes’ legislation were those ‘who 
feared the breakdown of a common moral order as reflected in the family or in the demographic make-
up of the state (…) (Simon 2001: 97)’.. 
Secondly Simon attempts to find an explanation in terms of Elias’ theory of civilisation. Are there 
signs of a certain de-civilisation, a decrease in shame and embarrassment when expressing or 
regarding the expression of cruelty? Elias posited a homology (an identity in form and style) between 
psychical order and self-control on the one hand and between social order and social control on the 
other, and this presupposes a close relation between individual and society.  When citizens exercise 
self-discipline and give up satisfying ‘improper’ needs than this must indicate the existence of a 
certain solidarity with fellow-citizens and a willingness to accept the obligations associated with it:  
the welfare state was promoted by this and in turn the welfare state rewarded solidarity with adequate 
and reliable care in case of mishaps and disasters in personal life. But, says Simon:  
‘The larger political and economic strategies of neo-liberalism tend to place many of the 
burdens back on individuals. What remains of organized forms of social solidarity is further 
problematized by increased immigration and growing fragmentation of the society into 
geographically segregated class and race enclaves. These changes may be breaking down the 
psychical equilibrium that the civilising process presupposed’ (Simon 2001:95).. 
Pratt, also in a reflection based on Elias, reminds us that the theoreticians of the ‘risk-society’ have 
demonstrated that the ‘networks of interdependence’  in that type of society have dramatically changed 
and have above all become more unpredictable and more fluid :  
‘It is as if all the road maps of everyday life which the state had previously drawn up on our 
behalf have been removed: in the new ones that replace them, the state only sketches in vague 
landmarks around which we must then undertake our own cartography’(Pratt 2005:265).. 
Our situation of growing uncertainties about our identity that goes together with the weakened or even 
dissolved networks of reciprocal dependency promotes the construction of   
‘common, easily identifiable enemies who seem to put us further at risk, whether these be 
particular types of criminal or new categories of unwanted citizens, such as refugees (….). 
Under these circumstances, the habitus of self-restraint begins to give way to more 
unrestrained outlets of emotion, as all the assurances which had allowed us to take 
uncertainties and vicissitudes  in our stride, or to tolerate those whose conduct or character 
seemed undesirable, begin to unravel. Indeed, we now live in an era of road rage, hospital 
rage, and so on – as if, without the social solidity of the pre-1970 period, ad hoc outbursts of 
anger can now become our response to delays, frustrations, and inconveniences; and a new 
intolerance – zero tolerance – of those not making a contribution to social wellbeing’.   
Pratt is more assertive in his conclusions than Simon:  
‘There is less self-restraint on the part of individuals but a simultaneous yearning for stronger 
and clearer responses from the state’ (Pratt 2005: 265).  
Political elites – and not so much the bureaucratic and professional  groups working in the criminal 
justice system (Hallsworth 2000: 154)
.
 - have responded to this ‘yearning for stronger and clearer 
answers’ to a seemingly dissolving social structure and the concomitant occurrence of crime and 
nuisance, not with rational self-restraint but by embracing what Garland has termed a ‘criminology of 
the other’, which allows for an aggressive, populist criminal policy (sold under the guise of efficacy in 
terms of protection against crime).  Garland circumscribes this criminology of the other  as a:   
‘criminology of the alien other which represents criminals as dangerous members of distinct 
racial and social groups which bear little relation to “us”. It is, moreover, a  “criminology” 
which trades in images, archetypes and anxieties, rather than in careful analysis and research 
findings – more a politicised discourse of the unconscious than a detailed form of knowledge-
for-power’ (Garland 1996: 461).  
This type of criminology is one of the aspects of a political strategy of ‘denial’  of the increasing 
failure of traditional criminal justice to deal adequately with modern phenomena of crime from the 
centre of the national state (2001:137-138). 
The observable call for punishments that are so hard that they can be called cruel, could according to 
Simon also be explained from the success of the civilising process itself. The features contributing to 
civilisation also contribute to a greater fear of violence and a stronger empathy with victims, which 
may induce a willingness to accept very harsh measures:  
‘Because we see punishment as an instrumentally useful security device, we may not respond 
to it as an act of violence (…)’.   
In this respect it is important that the bureaucratic and professional elites administrating criminal 
justice have made the execution of punishment quite invisible for the public and are expected to 
perform their duties in a calm and dispassionate way, despite passionately punitive political rhetoric.  
We must and may hope that this is still to a certain degree the case with our public prosecutors and our 
judges, although the former are brought more directly under the political direction of the minister of 
justice and the latter are nowadays publicly criticised for being too lenient. The right-wing populist 
party PVV has even proposed  abolishing the appointment of judges for life and dismissing those 
judges who have been punishing too leniently. This proposal will not be supported broadly, but the 
announced introduction of mandatory minimum sentences may also do the job of harnessing judicial 
discretion to mete out punishments which they consider just in the case at hand.  
What has been outlined above is a sketch of the most important  developments in public discourse and 
criminal policy in the Netherlands to show the probability of an actual decrease of the level of 
civilisation in Dutch criminal justice.  At the very least conditions are building up for a kind of justice 
that no longer counteracts and checks tendencies towards cruelty but celebrates them. The degree to 
which legal professionals in various functions manage to mitigate these developments is an empirical 
question that cannot be discussed and answered here. In as far as there are ways to sidestep punitive 
expectations many will try to do so, when they perceive more positive forms of tailored sanctioning.  
It is known, f.i., that Dutch criminal courts are much less inclined to impose the measure of detention 
for repetitive offenders – with a minimum duration of two years -  when it becomes apparent that the 
administration will not promote rehabilitation for the convicted offender but only aims at temporary 
incapacitation (Struijk 2008: 367).
.
In reaction to the proposed introduction of mandatory minimum 
penalties in cases of recidivism many judges have announced that they will do all that is within their 
power to avoid having to impose them, just as courts have done historically at times when legal 
punishments were (seen by them as) excessively harsh.
10
 Quite correctly they insist that allowing 
mandatory punishments for recidivism will in the foreseeable future imply the introduction of 
mandatory punishments for first offenders. They fear that the predictable instrumental failures of the 
mandatory sentence for recidivists will be interpreted as proof that the first punishment was already 
inadequately low, since all functional expectations of the punishment depend on its harshness.
.
 
4.1. Problematic publicity 
A last relevant factor to mention in connection with the punitive populism that dominates Dutch 
criminal policies is the functional role of the mass-media in amplifying fear of crime and promoting 
the simplistic ‘solution’ of punishment. Not only crime, but also the way the justice system functions 
has increasingly become ‘mediatised’.  In a reconstruction of the relations between the justice system 
and the media in several consecutive decades, Brants  and Brants demonstrate that attention has shifted 
from ‘serving the common public interest together’ to a battle between justice system and media based 
on conflicting interests. Where initially there was mutual trust and consensus about the common 
interest and its implications, there grew an increasing distrust in the way the criminal justice agencies 
supposedly served it. The loss of trust became almost total in the era 1980-1990, precisely when the 
criminal-political discourse sounded the alarm because of a highly increased level of recorded 
(property-) crime and made a drastic turn away from the traditional Dutch reticent politics - of 
parsimony with punishment and predominant use of social policies – to an attempt to ‘regain’ trust in 
criminal justice by a ‘consequent, consistent and credible’ use of repression.  In the context of this new 
punitivism the PPS itself began actively to use the media  to show the public that they were ‘now’ 
really fighting crime with tough measures. Paradoxically, however, this led to the opposite image of 
justice as failing to achieve its ends.  In the post-2000 era Brants and Brants witness a spiral of highly 
tuned up expectations and deep disappointments. There is an interaction between the justice system 
and the media   
‘in which the latter continually stress that the rule of law is threatened [by crime, jrb], that 
criminal justice has no adequate response, is incompetent, makes mistakes, covers up cases – 
making it unlikely that the justice system can be entrusted with the important duty of serving 
the common, public interest. This message however is not given in a vacuum.  In political 
discourse there are constant promises that the more severely punitive approach, that the public 
anxiously asks for, indeed offers the solution. The justice system brags with new legislation,  
reorganisations of the Public Prosecution Service and the police, all geared to more efficient  
and cost-effective  performance. The picture that arises from the media is however that the 
situation is only getting worse’ (Brants and Brants 2002:24. My translation, jrb).. 
Prof. A.C. ’t Hart (2001) has drawn attention to the inherent fundamental tensions between the 
mediating functions of law in a democratic state and the way in which news – about crime and society, 
criminal justice and adjudication – is constructed and presented. Whereas the (principles of) ‘internal’ 
and ‘external ’ publicity of  adjudication have both an instrumental  and a legal-protective function, the 
                                                     
10 The editorial of the important Dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad of 14 september 2011, p. 2, reports under 
the heading ‘No need for judges’: ‘Judges and prosecutors will avoid unreasonable consequences. They will be 
the last who are still taking account of the offenders interests. When the punishment can no longer be tailored, 
then messing about with the charge might be the only way to do justice.’ (my translation, JRB). The editorial 
comment  rightly states that this will have an undermining effect and will lead  to a crisis of trust.  
 
protective dimension is often totally lacking in mass-media publicity, especially in television coverage, 
about crime and the allegedly involved suspects and victims.  Where the penal law and procedure have 
the obligation and capacity to make multiple interests, needs and perceptions compatible in a legal 
conceptualisation of problems and conflicts, and to solve the latter in terms of the law, the media tend 
to suggest a direct access to the ‘one and only truth’ of the matter, described in everyday language.. 
Criminal justice can only perform its function of mediating various and often conflicting perceptions 
of truth by keeping its artificial, legal concepts as open as possible, which avoids the monopolising of 
the meaning of legal concepts by one or more of the conflicting parties.  This leaves space for a 
possible recognition of other ways of viewing reality and of being human (alterity: that is the inherent 
right and capacity to be different). But the media powerfully ontologise (hypostasise) one image of 
reality: in this way they disturb and undermine the procedural, distanced and dispassionate mediation 
of different views on truth and reality by creating the illusion that there is such a thing as an easily 
knowable, obvious truth (‘t Hart 2001:158). .Perhaps needless to say, but important to note in the 
context of this contribution, is that the ‘criminology of the other’– the criminalising imagery about 
certain social groups (most recently ‘biker gangs’) – is disseminated by mass media, as well as 
traditional imagery about innocent victims and predatory offenders, carved as it were in a culturally 
available dualistic frame of thinking. Not only the pluralistic nature of democracy itself, but also the 
capacity to live together as citizens in our (temporary) capacities as offenders and victims tend to be 
denied in much mass-media coverage of crime and justice.  
5. Restorative Justice and other strategies of civilisation  
It is one thing to try to demonstrate that certain developments seem to bring about a tendency of de-
civilisation, but quite another to indicate the ways in which we could try to counter such a tendency. It 
is evidently not just a matter of making different political decisions regarding criminal justice, but also 
of building public support for those other decisions and of more objective social and social-economic 
conditions. But we will not focus here on the ways in which change could be brought about, but only 
on the ideas that might convince our fellow-citizens of the desirability and even necessity of certain 
changes in justice policies. Hopefully, opinion-leaders will one day succeed in publicly defending an 
alternative view on criminal justice, reviving old valuable principles and introducing new principles 
appealing to emancipated and consciously democratic citizens (Lissenberg 2005).
.
The greatest 
challenge here seems to be breaking through the  ‘instrumentalist syndrome’, nowadays apparently 
broadly accepted, that deconstructs criminal justice in its classical, legal protective dimensions to 
facilitate an oiled machinery – an assembly-line - of punitive interventions.  Reconfirming the 
classical protective functions – protective of the suspected individual in his conflict with the state that 
criminally charges him - through the penal procedure and based in narrowly circumscribed offences in 
the substantive law could and should be combined with a new set of ideas with regard to how criminal 
justice could achieve its other aims, besides legal protection of suspects. Amidst those other aims, 
general and special prevention, conflict-resolution and channeling vengeful feelings a special new aim 
– introducing new problems – is giving voice and recognition to the victims, who have returned to the 
arena of criminal justice after having been almost completely excluded for almost two centuries.  
Restorative Justice not only offers foundations for a strong involvement of victims, and procedures in 
which they can be involved if they wish, it also is grounded in a much more modern set of ideas about 
responding to offences and offenders: a modern anthropology that is far removed from the utilitarian 
anthropology of Bentham and Beccaria, which provided the classic criminal law with its predominant 
functional model of influencing the general conduct of legal subjects: threatening with punishments. It 
is because these threats have to be credible, that punishment must always follow upon a crime, as 
Feuerbach argued. Only then a certain ‘psychological force’ can be assumed to go from the threat 
itself. The concrete imposition of the promised amount of pain can then also be justified as retribution 
for the fact that you, suspect, have not been deterred. It is this deeply engrained belief in deterrence 
that causes criminal justice to be easily perverted into an inhuman system of pain-infliction. Inhuman, 
but also highly ineffective in view of large scale recidivism and the social reproduction of crimes and 
criminals through the cultural and structural organisation of the criminal justice system, with the 
prison as its symbol core institution (Quinney 1970; Christie 1981).  
The inadequacy of continuing to reason within the classical models of deterrence and retribution is 
demonstrated by the discourse of Easton and Piper in their chapter in this book.  Discussing the 
influence of past convictions on sentencing they argue that on principle, retributive (desert-) theory 
offers a greater hope of limiting the impact if tempered by the principle of parsimony, concurring with 
von Hirsch and Ashworth who state that the examples  of Finland and Sweden ‘demonstrate that ….. 
adoption of desert and proportionality as guiding principles does not lead to greater severity’.  This is 
what has also been brought forward in The Netherlands with regard to retributive philosophy in 
general.  Judge and scholar Otte (2002) argued for a revival of the retributive approach to punishment, 
complaining about the apparent boundlessness of actual, consequential sentencing.
.
But without any 
noticeable effect. In one of the very few other (more or less recent) defenses of retribution, it is argued 
that punishment is viewed much too rational in consequentialist approaches and that there is a certain 
element of ‘irrationality’ in sentencing that can be accommodated with or expressed in retributive 
sentencing (Knigge 1988).  But should we really escape from our theoretical and practical difficulties 
into an acceptance of irrationality and irrational state responses to crime?  Where are the limits then? 
Easton and Piper also show how in the UK past convictions have become elements to take into 
account when determining the punishment for the case at hand. Something which would not be in 
conformity with pure desert theory, that would focus attention on the case at hand, when previous 
offences have already been punished. But political and popular opinion seem to stress the importance 
of the criminal record for the determination of punishment and retributive theorists have been trying to 
accommodate their theories to allow for that. Perhaps with the same feeling that Easton and Piper 
vent:  
‘it would seem to us that using previous convictions to aggravate the seriousness of the 
offence (…) is an aspect of sentencing against which it is currently impossible to argue.’ (this 
volume, p…..) 
They go on by saying:  
‘Punishing persistence accords with popular ideas of justice. Its use therefore needs to be more 
controlled and restrained through specific guidance’. (This volume, p…..)  
They are not saying which guidance they would prefer substantively, but note that providing such 
guidance to ‘ensure consistency and restraint in the calculation of seriousness in a retributivist 
sentencing framework is (…) a complex and difficult issue.’ Agencies in the UK such as most recently 
the Sentencing Council have produced ever more detailed guidance but:  
‘ it is the mandatory aggravation of seriousness on the account of previous offending which 
now threatens to alter significantly these calculations and lead to disproportionate sentences.’ 
(This volume, p……..) 
Above I have mentioned that the same pressures – towards mandatory, more severe punishment in 
cases of recidivism
11
 – are evident in the Netherlands and theoreticians of penal law and penological 
scientists seem not to be able to do much more than adapt their reasoning to allow for these pressures, 
deliver futile protest statements, or stay out of the public debate.  As for judges, practically involved in 
sentencing on a daily basis, they are aware of the various theoretical legitimations of punishment and 
they have their preferences for f.i. retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation or even restoration.  But when 
you examine their actual imposed sentences, these appear to have no relation to their personal beliefs: 
the imposed punishments cannot be explained on the grounds of the theoretical preferences of the 
judges with regard to legitimate punishment (De Keijser 2000).
.
Institutional arrangements, such as the 
functional relation between the PPS and the courts, sentencing guidelines (PPS) and ‘punishment 
orientation lists’ (of the courts) and the fact that the most serious cases are decided by courts of three 
judges, determining the sentence together, are factors that bring about a sentencing praxis that seems 
to be uncontrolled rather than controlled by any actor in the system. In view of the wide discretion that 
is built into the system, predominant political discourse must be assumed to have a strong, if not 
decisive, influence. 
Beliefs in deterrence seem to be decisively influencing abstract scales of just desert, through the 
legislative process of enhancing the threatened punishments on existing crimes and offences. Once the 
substantive law has been adapted to express a higher level of perceived severity of the crime, the level 
of retribution follows from that in each individual case. Fundamentally, what is wrong here is that a 
normative dimension, the severity of a crime, is supposed to be given expression in factual terms: the 
number of years of incarceration and such.
12
 Since this a categorical mistake and the normative 
dimension really cannot be factually weighed and measured, there is no intrinsic limit to expressing 
the abstract severity of a crime. It could be placed on a scale (or ladder) of a number of crimes, 
differing with regard to their relative severity, but then the whole scale could be moved up or down in 
severity without any objective foundation or touchstone.
13
  These problems seem to have become more 
                                                     
11 
With the same reason as was given in the English CJA 1993 which stated that: ‘In considering the seriousness of 
any offence, the court may take into account (any previous convictions of the offender or) any failure of his to 
respond to previous sentences.’  Failure to be deterred becomes itself a proof of moral degeneration. 
 
12 Of course there are always factual consequences but also these have to be and are evaluated normatively, 
which can be seen when one compares the meaning of killing in various contexts. The acceptance of expressing 
normative evaluations in ‘numerical’ or quantitative dimensions is nothing more than a convention. The 
inadequacy of this convention is most strongly felt perhaps when crimes are so massive and devastating that no 
punitive response whatsoever could express our rejection. On the other hand, when offences have only minor 
consequences most of us would agree that a caution may in circumstances be an adequate response. 
 
13 Louk Hulsman wrestled with this problem of ‘severity’ and ‘severity-scales’ without really finding a solution. 
See: L.H.C. Hulsman (1981), ‘Waarover beslist men eigenlijk in het strafrechtelijk system?’,  in  Beginselen. 
Opstellen aangeboden aan G.E. Mulder, Arnhem: Gouda Quint, pp. 107-116. Abstracted severity (as in penal law 
provisions) seems often misleading, for concrete severity remains contextual and contingent. Perhaps 
participatory justice, involving victim and offenders and significant others, does indeed offer a more reliable way 
of assessing severity, as Hulsman must have surmised.  
 
serious in their consequences now that there is so much ‘surrogate participation’ of citizens (non-
victims and non-offenders) in the social drama of crime, through the means of the mass-media. 
Criminal justice has become more ‘responsive’ but it is a responsiveness to often deeply misleading 
images of offenders and victims, the nature of crime, crime-causation and –prevention.   
As Louk Hulsman has remarked, civil (private) law seems to function quite well in preventing and 
redressing serious wrongs without the use of notions such as deterrence
14
 and retribution: so should 
they not be ignored in designing a better system of public (criminal) law? More participation of the 
victim and a different participation of the offender in procedures of criminal justice, by putting 
compensation (or restitution) for the victim central:  these were Hulsmans suggestions for a way out, 
projecting a reform program implying making a default use of civil law (Hulsman 1968).  Could it 
indeed not be so, that the most strategic decision we could make, with regard to our criminal justice 
system, is to make criminal justice fundamentally participatory for and dialogic with those directly or 
indirectly involved in and touched by (the consequences of) a criminal offence? Indeed, this is what 
McElrea contends when he stresses that restorative justice is above all a ‘procedural revolution’ (This 
volume, p…….). Hulsman claimed that we should give relatively more influence to those directly 
involved in deciding what should be done, than to those who are only involved as a consumer of 
stories of crime and punishment without any real experience or knowledge of the reality of criminal 
events (Hulsman 1979). 
 This does not imply a privatisation of the problem of crime and the response to it, but the much more 
difficult task of reforming public (criminal) law on well-defined grounds, with different foundational 
concepts and different practices, which could be defined as hybrid practices in the sense that - in the 
domain of criminal justice - procedures will be allowed that are predominantly of a civil law nature 
like forms of mediation. Gutwirth and De Hert express amazement that restorative justice protagonists 
devote so little attention to the civil law domain and they are right that there is a much closer link 
between restorative justice and civil law than with today’s criminal law arrangements and theory. They 
would like to maintain a more reduced criminal justice system – with much less use of imprisonment, 
which they call a monstrosity (this volume, p…….)  - and want to achieve that reduction by 
transferring certain categories of criminal offences to the civil law system (and by depenalisation in 
the sense of down-scaling penal sanctions?)
15
. This is an interesting strategy, but the same result (in 
terms of reducing the scope of penal law and punishment) could also be achieved by adapting the 
criminal justice system in ways that allow restorative procedures to be used in a maximum number of 
categories of criminal offences. This is what Walgrave proposes to do: maximise the use of restorative 
procedures and sanctions in criminal justice:  
‘Pushing back as much as possible the punitive premise in the response to crime is the logical 
next phase in the civilisation process. That means less coercion and less pain-infliction in a 
top-down imposition of a formal legal order, but more space for voluntary, non-violent 
bottom-up responses.’ (This volume, p…….) 
                                                     
14 This is correct when one looks at civil law doctrine itself, but the idea of deterrence plays a role in legal 
economics, mainly in terms of monetary consequences.  
 
15
 The Report on Decriminalisation of the Council of Europe speaks about depenalisation in two ways: the first is 
the abolition of a penalising provision as such, the second is penalisation at a lower level of punishment. 
Van Stokkom's proposal implies reducing the applicability of imprisonment by a bifurcated criminal 
policy that allows no custodial sanctions for offenders who show themselves to be trustworthy and 
responsible by a recognisable degree of remorse:  
‘Remorse indicates that the offender is connected with the values the law is appealing to. He is 
morally approachable. Genuine remorse points at a positive moral disposition, a commitment 
to comply, an indication that trust can be renewed.’ (This volume, p…..)16 
These three strategies of reform carry differing implications of course, which need to be looked at 
further. But it is obvious that each implies legislative operations which need to be thoroughly 
discussed and consciously prepared in a democratic legislature: this need for a democratic, broad 
debate is not a disadvantage of some kind, but refers to the crucial social-political condition of 
political legitimacy – and therefore plausibility and feasibility - of legal reform.   
Integrating both the foundational and the practical procedural aspects of restorative justice into the 
criminal justice system can be done and would bring not only  more ‘civil law’-like procedures into its 
domain but also promote more civilised responses to criminal offending. Provided, of course, that the 
integration is carefully designed to leave room for classical due process of law, enabling the accused to 
dispute a charge that could lead to imposition of punishment, whenever that appears to be necessary.  
All legal subjects should keep their classic, procedural human rights, such as the right of access to an 
independent court, to adequate defense and to have full participation in a fair trial. When restorative 
procedures are allowed and followed, these should be legally framed in such way that they do not 
implicitly undermine procedural rights the participants would have in a criminal trial. Leaving aside 
the question whether De Hert and Gutwirth are not a bit too critical in their reading of Walgrave's  
approach, as summarized in his contribution to this book, and of Braithwaite's work, they are right in 
drawing attention to possible regressive implications of a specific way of integrating restorative justice 
into criminal justice. The challenge is to preserve the concepts of substantive criminal law while at the 
same time accepting a system in which the presumption of punishment
17
 as the only acceptable 
response to a criminal offence is abolished.  It should be noted that indeed, as De Hert and Gutwirth 
remark(this volume, p……), the criminal justice system is not as radically punitive as restorativists 
often claim. A lot of responses that the criminal justice system produces (and allows) are already today 
not really punishments in a strict sense. And on a theoretical level punishment is still seen as 
acceptable only as the last resort. But one of the problems is, that the centrality of the notion of 
punishment in the criminal justice system has induced a legal culture in which the normative 
connection between ‘crime and punishment’  dominates the dogmatic, systematic ordering of all 
possible legal answers to criminal offending, placing all responses which are ‘not punishment’ as 
(allowable or not allowable) deviations from the normative answer ‘punishment’. And this legal 
culture seems to be changing nowadays into one that allows more easily the imposition of what is 
intended as punishment, but without fair trial (e.g. the penal dispositions of the PPS introduced in the 
Netherlands). Penal instrumentalism, as Klip (2010) remarked, loves punishment but it is not very 
fond of law. 
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 This path has also been trodden by David Cornwell in The Clapham Omnibus (2009), Ch. 11, pp. 149-163. 
17 Punishment is here taken in its classical definition as a deliberately intended imposition of pain. An 
alternative way of reasoning would be to say that we should change the meaning of the word punishment. As 
Walgrave notes, this might be like trying to find dry water. 
 
McElrea is undoubtedly right when he claims that restorative justice implies above all a procedural 
revolution: indeed conferencing as introduced in New-Zealand is a remarkable innovation, but in view 
of the multiple and endlessly varied situations to which the criminal justice system has to respond it is 
important to recognize that it should have – and has already – various kinds of procedures available18 
to deliver the kind of response deemed most appropriate. And the introduction of new procedural 
forms – even new types of participants  such as victims, offenders or their relatives – must be taken to 
express  new ways of thinking about appropriate aims and procedures and changing insights about 
how law can best be maintained. Besides the recognition of victims as participating stakeholders, there 
is also a growing belief that offenders should be approached and engaged in a different way, implying 
inherently different roles also for legal (and other) professionals. 
19
       
It could be that these ‘new’ insights are in fact anthropological insights that have been around longer 
and that are and should be rediscovered:  with Reggio I think that this is the case. Penal 
instrumentalism should be viewed as an extreme expression of the ‘modern’ image of man as an 
objectified and manageable individual, a self-sufficient free-floating particle.  It is this image of man 
as a ‘closed personality’ that Norbert Elias rejected as a consequence of the inextricable connection he 
discovered between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’  civilisation.  His image of man is that of an ‘open personality 
who possesses a greater or lesser degree of relative (but never absolute and total) autonomy vis-à-vis 
other people and who is (…) fundamentally orientated towards and dependent on other people 
throughout his or her life. The network of interdependencies among people is what binds them 
together’ (Elias 2000: 481)..This open, relational image of man has become one of the core elements of 
the relational theory of justice that is defended and developed in the Dutch speaking countries by A.C. 
‘t Hart and R. Foqué, offering the foundations for a radical critique of penal instrumentalism.  It is 
only this open, relational image of man that enables us to understand the importance of how symbolic 
interactions in (and around) law enforcement contribute to the ‘production’ of the criminal we fear or 
the law-abiding citizen we hope for: the importance of ‘normal smithing’ taking place and not ‘deviant 
smithing’ (Maruna, 2001) as is often the case.  
As Reggio correctly observes (This volume, p…..), criminal justice and restorative justice may not be 
totally opposed or even mutually exclusive, but restorative justice’s presuppositions, normative 
assertions and goals are distant from those of criminal justice and are even alternatives to them, 
reacting to the modern understanding of law and justice. Firstly, RJ pays much attention to ‘relational 
textures’ while modern criminal justice  is characterized by a mainly individual (and often utilitarian) 
anthropological model. Secondly, RJ attempts to envision an  idea of legal order that is experience-
based, context-sensitive and open to complexity, while the modern world-view contains an abstract, 
rationalistic, mathematic-geometrical, standardized conception of – all kinds of – order. In 
                                                     
18 For the Netherlands one can discern procedures which (begin and) end at the level of the police, such that end 
at the level of the PPS and such that end at a court level, before or after trial. From the most appropriate aims we 
could mention cautioning, diversion, influencing conduct through specific conditions, avoiding prosecution, and 
the imposition of punishment.   
 
19 The ‘problem solving courts’ in the USA and their link to the approach of ‘therapeutical jurisprudence’ and 
other forms of ‘Non-adversarial Justice’ could be mentioned as one of the most telling developments besides RJ: 
Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol, Ross Hyams (eds) (2009), Non-Adversarial Justice, Sydney: The 
Federation Press.     
 
consequence the restorative approach to justice tends to conceive a ‘horizontal’, ‘relational’ and 
‘context-sensitive’ idea of legal order, as opposed to the hierarchical conception of legal order within 
the context of the state as a monopolistic actor.  
Assuming that indeed criminal justice and restorative justice are neither  totally opposed nor mutually 
exclusive, the most important decision that legislators should take is when restorative justice or 
punitive justice should have precedence. This is on the legislative level above all a decision about the 
categories of crimes and offences in which a decision-making process between the two most involved 
citizens  - victims and offenders – may or should have a chance to develop. And of course, what types 
of legal consequences could be attached to the results of such deliberations.
20
 On the basis of these 
generic decisions, abstracted from specific cases, in each concrete case it will depend on the attitudes 
and wishes of those directly involved whether the offer to engage in a deliberative procedure leads to 
mediation or conferencing with certain results, to be determined together within the limits of the law. 
Criteria could be developed for referring cases which were selected for prosecution  and punishment  
to a restorative procedure: for instance when victims in the particular case, despite the  legislator's 
expressed preference for punitive justice, express a pre-dominant desire for consensual agreement and 
this seems to be achievable in view of the attitude and wishes of the offender(s) in case.  Transfers 
from an initially restorative procedure to a penal process should also be possible and regulated, with 
special attention to safeguards for offenders and victims. At least this flexibility should be made 
possible, when it is not already there.   
It is striking, that in developing ‘soft’, supra-national European law, this kind of reform of the criminal 
(and criminal procedural) law is actually asked for.  The EU Framework-decision of 2001 with regard 
to (strengthening) the position of victims in the criminal procedure (2001, nr. 6335/01, art. 10 s. 1)
21
, 
obliges the member states to promote ‘mediation in criminal cases for offences which it considers 
appropriate for this sort of measure’. The second section of art. 10  stipulates that each member state 
shall ensure that 'any agreement between the victim and the offender (…) can be taken into account.’ 
Mediation in criminal cases is defined as ‘the search, prior to or during criminal proceedings, for a 
negotiated  solution between the victim and the author of an offence (…)22  
6. The strategic value of agreements  
                                                     
20 This decision should be categorical in order to safeguard equality in terms of the law and to avoid arbitrary 
allocations of restorative and punitive procedures on the basis of discriminatory prejudices with regard to 
individual offenders. It is also necessary to create foreseeability for victims and offenders of the consequences of 
engaging in a restorative procedure. In sum, for reasons of legality.  
 
21 In the Netherlands this framework-decision has led to changes in the code of criminal procedure, in force 
from  1 january 2011 (Title IIIA  concerning the rights of the victim). The Framework-decision will be 
transformed into a Directive with the same purport but with more explicit guarantees for victims who are offered 
a mediation procedure.  
 
22 Article 1 sub e. This frame decision is now being transformed into a Directive, with changes relating to 
safeguards for victims in mediation, but these core elements are maintained.  
 
In a strategy of reforming criminal justice to make it more restorative the importance of legal 
permissibility of agreements, reached by mediation and conferencing ( ‘extended mediation’) cannot 
be overestimated.  For the primary parties (victim and offender) themselves, for society in general and 
for the criminal justice system the allowance of agreements will have many functions and effects. 
The UN Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes
.
- published in 2006 – speaks of  ‘restorative 
outcomes’ , described as  ‘an agreement reached as a result of a restorative process’.23  It states:  
‘The agreement may include referrals to programmes such as reparation, restitution and 
community services, “ aimed at meeting the individual and collective needs and 
responsibilities of the parties and achieving the reintegration of the victim and the  offender”. 
It may also be combined with other measures in cases involving serious offences’.(p. 7) 
The combination of the agreement with ‘other measures’  allows for imposition of sanctions besides 
and above the obligations for the offender included in the agreement; these  often imply restitution or 
compensation for damages,  community service, obligations to address criminogenic factors etc., 
which could often also  be imposed by a public prosecutor or court. The close connection between the 
‘restorative process’ and  ‘restorative outcomes’ – the participatory, direct and oral character of  
restorative procedure –  is assumed to make the crucial difference with traditional imposition of 
punishments. Through this close connection, this dynamic, the ‘process goals’ of restorative 
procedures are served. These goals are described in the
.
 Handbook as follows: 
1. Victims who agree to be involved in the process can do so safely and come out of it satisfied; 
2. Offenders understand how their action has affected the victim and other people, assume 
responsibility for the consequences of their action and commit to making reparation;  
3. Flexible measures are agreed upon by the parties which emphasize repairing the harm done 
and, wherever possible, also address the reasons for the offence; 
4. Offenders live up to their commitment to repair the harm done and attempt to address factors 
that led to their behaviour; and,  
5. The victim and the offender both understand the dynamic that led to the specific incident, gain 
a sense of closure and are reintegrated into the community. (p. 9) 
 
Procedural aims 2, 3 and 4 have a direct relation with the content and the intention of the agreement 
and demonstrate that the obligations that can be agreed upon are to be subsumed in at least two 
categories:  firstly restorative obligations vis-à-vis the victim and secondly obligations of the offender 
to address what has been going wrong in their own life and what contributed to their offending 
conduct. In view of the fact that restorative justice aims to be a part of the public law system, there are 
also interests of the society at large to be satisfied: the public will want to know that the response to 
the offence was adequate and that the obligations are creating conditions for better conduct in the 
future and a return to the norms and values of legitimate behavioural expectations.  This is why 
promising to enter for instance a drug-rehabilitation programme  is called a restorative outcome. If 
needed, in view of the nature and circumstances
24
 of the offence, some restorative obligations may be 
                                                     
23 A restorative process is defined as: ‘any process in which the victim and the offender and, where appropriate, 
any other individuals or community members affected by a crime participate together actively in the resolution 
of matters arising from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator’(p. 7). 
 
24 E.g. a high level of media coverage following the event.
 
 
agreed to ‘make good’ with society f.i. by  doing community service. When the latter type of 
obligations (aim no. 3) is not discussed and proposed by the parties themselves  a judicial authority – 
public prosecutor or court – might wish to add it, broadening the scope of the agreement.  It should be 
noted that the  legal entitlement for the parties to reach an agreement, and the possibility that judicial 
authorities might change the agreement, preferably with the consent of the parties, implies that we are 
really looking at a ‘three party agreement’  with a mixed private-public character. And of course  the 
civil parties cannot reach results which would imply incarceration: only equivalents of non-custodial 
sanctions could be proposed, since custodial sanctions can only be imposed by courts in view of the 
required stronger protection of human rights.    
Integrating restorative justice into the criminal justice system, by allowing the use of restorative 
procedures in many categories of offences, would imply that – when cases are cleared up and there are 
no doubts about the facts –  communication and deliberation between all stakeholders becomes the 
core dynamic of maintaining the law when the parties make use of restorative procedures.  Emotional 
and material impact of the offence on victims, perceptions of the offending conduct from victim, 
offenders and others, normative and moral reasons for condemning the offending conduct and for 
taking account of interests and needs of fellow-citizens, thinking through how the wrong and harms 
can best be repaired and how a better life can be promoted:  all these become objects of oral, face-to-
face communication in order to discuss what should happen with the aftermath of the offence.  In the 
stage of developing an agreement, and also later, when the resulting agreement is scrutinized by 
judicial authorities, the necessity to be thoughtful, prudent and considerate, to take the roles of others 
and to take account of all sorts of reciprocal dependence will be evident in view of the aim, to reach an 
agreement (and to avoid as much as possible an imposition of unhelpful sanctions).  In this way 
integrating restorative justice may push towards a re-civilisation of criminal justice. Three specific 
aims could be discerned of this strategy of grounding (a part of) criminal justice in private-public 
agreements:  1) de-victimisation of victims, 2) de-criminalisation of offender-identities and 3) 
depenalisation  (in the sense of downscaling) of criminal justice sanctions.  These aims will be briefly 
discussed now.   
6.1. De-victimisation of victims (injured parties) 
Injured parties should be enabled to liberate themselves as soon as possible from the status of being a 
‘victim’, because experiencing this status and the social and cultural connotations of victimhood are 
detrimental to their own for self-image (personal identity, feelings of self-worth) and worldview.  This 
has been demonstrated among others by the Dutch victimologist Van Dijk (2006):  the label ‘victim’ 
carries conflicting social expectations. On the one hand it is expected that the ´victima´  will liberate 
offenders and others from their guilt by forgiveness.
25
 On the other hand it is supposed that the victim 
will have an almost boundless desire for revenge, that needs to be constrained and controlled by the 
criminal trial, keeping the victim sidelined and sublimating damaging emotions as much as possible.  
Legal scholar Verrijn Stuart (1994) has drawn attention to the circumstance, that when victims remain 
victims too long  and become predominantly perceived as victims by others, they risk to become 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
25 Van Dijk contends that the archetype of the Christian victima (sacrifice) is Jezus Christ, who would turn the 
other cheek.  
 




Victims should be taken seriously and be approached in their strength, not in their weakness:  on the 
grounds of an assumption of competence to stand up for themselves, not  of helplessness and need of 
care. After the Austrian case of Natasha Kampusch – the girl who was incarcerated for years in the 
cellar of her kidnapper's house - Groenhuijsen and Van Dijk (leaders of the Tilburg International 
Institute for Victimology) claimed that Kampusch made very clear in her conduct after liberating 
herself: victimhood is no disease.
26
  A Dutch report on the needs of victims (Ten Boom and Kuijpers 
2008)
.
placed these needs in a hierarchical order, making use of Maslow's scale. At the bottom there are 
physiological needs which are generally not endangered after  surviving victimisation. The second 
level is that of primary needs for immediate safety and the need to prevent repetition, and the 
emotional needs for shelter and support, coping with and closure of the shocking event. On the third 
level there are the needs for love, belonging and positive relations to others, sometimes including the 
offender. The highest-placed needs are those of self-realisation and autonomy.  
The experience of victimisation is a source of existential uncertainty, of doubting personal 
competence, doubting others and a shaken belief in the inherent justice and predictability of the social 
world. One often cannot understand how and why one has become a victim and has a need to 
understand the situation and to be understood by others. Against this background  the psychologist  
Mooren
.
described the potential functions of a successful mediation between offenders and victims of 
violence, for the victims, as follows:  
‘Voluntarily confronting  the offender means that the victim again takes his own life in hand. 
Facing his own fear, without letting this fear dominate, strengthens the experience of 
competence. The situation of violence may have caused an acute loss of control. Meeting the 
offender in a situation where he (the offender)  is no longer in control and in which he needs 
something from the victim contributes to the recovery of the victim from the experience: the 
balance of power is now fundamentally different from that during the violent offence. The fact 
that the victim can confront the offender with what he has brought about, against the 
background of a hardly defined but definitely existing moral right, shifts the balance of power 
to the advantage of the victim (Mooren 2001:32. My translation, jrb).’ 
The process of mediation in criminal matters is fundamentally about re-vindication – with the support 
of the judicial authorities - of the right to be free from criminal intrusions in personal life and the 
recognition – in various forms – of injustice done to the victim and the need to restore justice.  
Walgrave (2008: 140-155), following Braithwaite and Pettit (1990), speaks of the restoration of the 
‘dominion’ (autonomy) that law should guarantee for all. 
6.2. Decriminalising offenders' identity 
Just like it is an existential shock to become a victim of a crime it is also a shock to have become the 
perpetrator of one, causing many moral, psychological and social questions and problems.
.
Even 
though a person might have contemplated committing an offence before the act, the various 
consequences of actually doing so are highly unclear and largely unpredictable. Often offenders realise 
                                                     
26 NRC-Handelsblad 13 september 2006: ‘Kampusch doet normaal, wij niet.’ (‘Kampusch acts normally, we do 
not’) 
 
only after the fact what they have actually done and how it may impact personal life perspectives and 
chances. Also for offenders the most urgent questions will relate to how to cope with the offence and 
its consequences and how the social relations to ‘the other’ in general will be in the future. The Dutch 
legal scholar and judge Pompe (1954), discovering symbolic interactionism in the early 1950s, 
observed that the first condition for becoming a ‘criminal’ was to commit a crime. But the second and 
more important condition is the development of an intimate bond between offence and offender, 
defining his identity and keeping his personal life organized around the fact of his crime. The fully 
developed ‘criminal’ will not think of himself as having committed a theft, but will say he is a thief.  
The (partial) status of criminal offender becomes a dominant status.    
A striking result of a recent evaluation of so-called ‘victim-offender-conversations’ is that many 
requests for such conversations came from offenders, although the talks were explicitly stated  to have 
no impact upon the penal process whatsoever (and sometimes are requested after the offender has been 
sentenced). So also without any hope for diminished punishment many offenders feel the desire to 
explain their actions to their victims and to apologise (one of the stated aims of the talks) (Van Garsse 
2012).  
Restorative procedures in general have as a pre-condition that the offenders who are addressed in the 
intake-stage acknowledge the basic facts of the criminal offence and are willing to take responsibility 
for the harmful consequences of their wrongful act. In this way a situation is created in which the 
offender can do two things at the same time (Duff 2001; 2002) : he can accept ownership and 
responsibility and at the same time he can dis-own his conduct and declare that this type of conduct is 
not typical for him: ‘I am sorry I stole from you and I am not a thief.’ In this way and by proposing 
and accepting several obligation to ‘morally repair’ the wrong and ‘factually restore’ the harm as well 
as possible, he can limit the damaging impact of his wrong act on his personal identity, which is in fact 
in the interest of the common good (Blad 2011). 
Fundamental in the restorative philosophy and practice is to avoid defining the person of the offender 
by his offence. It is the harmful act that is morally rejected, not the person of the offender. This 
arrangement makes it possible to avoid the attribution of a criminal identity to the person of the 
offender or to weaken this identity if it was already formed or in the process of formation: the offender 
can demonstrate how he relates now to his offence, that becomes an objectified historical life-event, 
the implications of which can be discussed with others. The offender is not made responsible in a 
passive way – by making him suffer the pain of punishment - but actively responsible for restoring the 
harmful consequences to the best of his abilities. 
The moral censure that is implicitly and explicitly communicated in restorative procedures, in 
combination with restorative obligations laid down in a consensual agreement, mean that restorative 
procedures are inherently  sanctioning wrongful behavior, while avoiding the ascription of a criminal 
identity. This avoidance is in the common interest, since fully formed criminal identities are expected 
and will allow themselves to keep on committing crimes, as is clearly demonstrated in ‘desistance’-
studies. 
It should be noted that opening up and offering restorative procedures (in many categories of criminal 
offences) is necessary to achieve the type of bifurcated criminal justice that Van Stokkom proposes in 
this volume.  For the choice of the type of penalty and to  ‘(…) assess the offender’s amenability to 
rehabilitation we require information about his degree of self-control, his empathy to the victim, his 
willingness to undergo rehabilitation, and many other subjective factors.’ (This volume, p……)  
Van Stokkom agrees with Steven Tudor who claims that we need to respect the offender's moral 
autonomy and dignity, and that it is precisely this respect that requires us to pay attention to the moral 
attitudes of wrongdoers:  
‘To ignore a person’s remorse can be to shun a fundamentally important aspect of his moral 
self, and can manifest a fundamental disrespect.’ (this volume, p………)   
Responsible and remorseful offenders deserve to receive only non-custodial sanctions, but for a 
reliable intersubjective evaluation of the offender's attitude towards his offence we need to follow 
voluntary restorative procedures (Blad 2011). 
This line of reasoning shows another important implication of integrating restorative justice into the 
criminal justice system: the categories of offences the legislator pre-selects for restorative procedures 
will be those that can in general be sanctioned sufficiently with only non-custodial sanctions.
27
  This is 
not to say that we should decide this question based on our actual patterns of imposing prison 
sentences:  reconsidering when incarceration is in general absolutely inevitable is implied in designing 
an integrated system.    
6.3. Depenalisation of criminal justice 
As Walgrave argues, the satisfaction offered by the offender to the victim can be interpreted as a moral 
form of ‘inversed retribution’: the offender ‘pays back’ his ‘ just dues’ to the victim.28 When this goal 
of the restorative procedure is achieved judicial authorities should be obliged to take account of this in 
their formal decisions about the case. Should this not be so, the moral and functional merits of the 
restorative procedure would be annulled. The ‘contractual’ obligations included in the agreement can 
easily be recognised and accepted as equivalents of the non-custodial sanctions that are widely 
available nowadays for both public prosecutors and courts.  The important change that is brought 
about by following restorative procedure is that, when agreed obligations are proposed to the judicial 
authorities, the legitimacy of approving these proposals will be almost complete, especially when and 
because the victim in case is one of the parties proposing to take the agreement as sufficient sanction.  
Importantly, voices in the media of ‘surrogate victims’ demanding firm punishments can then be 
contradicted by the expressed opinions of the real victim in case and the authority can show itself to be 
really responsive on the grounds of the detailed agreement by the parties involved. Additionally 
imposing the condition that the offender fully complies with the agreement will in most cases be 
sufficient. All this amounts to an opportunity to ‘depenalise’ – in the meaning of de-escalation of 
punishment (Council of Europe 1980) – an important part or criminal justice. 
                                                     
27 By preference those proposed by the parties as a result of a restorative meeting, if necessary imposed, as 
proposed by Walgrave, with restorative aims. 
 
28 But it could maybe better be argued, on historical grounds, that making apology and compensating for 
damages is retribution, and that the states monopoly a violence is a surrogate form of retribution: often defended 
because in history sometimes ‘compositions’ and restitutive agreements did not follow or were not complied 
with, leading to revenge and sometimes to feuds. How often this happened, and under which specific conditions, 
might be worthwhile to research.  
 
That the greater good can be served by a successful and officially sanctioned restorative procedure 
seems evident: the restorative procedure is inherently communicating censure and the offender works 
consciously towards a future without relapse and new victimisations. Succeeding in this the offender 
will receive rewards facilitating the development of a (more) positive self-image and social re-
integration. The legally facilitated and supported restorative procedures can in this way become the 
workshops for ‘smithing’ (Maruna 2001) .the ‘normal’ law-abiding citizen we would like to see as our 
neighbour, avoiding the most destructive sanction of imprisonment. 
7. Civilised justice and functionality 
Van Stokkom, Walgrave and Reggio all claim that it is an ethical choice and even a duty to install a 
restorative kind of criminal justice. The latter does so explicitly referring to the ‘open and relational’ 
image of man, which Elias deduced from his civilisation study, and the need for a permanent 
communication between humans in search for truth which means that ‘each person is responsible for 
searching for those contents that, given a certain context, provide the best reasons.’ This attitude to 
knowledge supports a ‘relational concept of humanity’, because the search for truth is then not 
solipsistic but structurally open to dialogue. This has important ethical implications:  
‘In the search for truth, no human being is superfluous; no human being can be silenced or set 
free from asking and providing reasons; and no one, in fact, is provided with definitive reasons 
or arguments for claiming that another human life is meaningless and therefore able to be 
treated as though it was an ‘object’. Indigence requires from each person a constant attitude to 
dialogue and it means that all human beings are reciprocal to each other and mutually involved 
as subjects entitled to ask questions and offer answers. Denying this dialogical principle 
embodies both a contradiction (denying the condition of indigence) and an act of 
violence.’(This volume, p……) 
Applied to the questions concerning crime and punishment the ‘dialogical principle’ means that crime 
can be viewed as a serious form of denial of the same principle:  
‘It represents (…) a violent act through which someone states his/her own will as absolute, and 
imposes (violently or with fraud) upon someone else undesired consequences (without 
considering each other’s reasons in a dialogical way).’ (This volume, p…..) 
Crime embodies both a personal and an inter-personal violation. It is therefore inappropriate to view 
crime entirely in terms of a specific legal violation that is sanctioned with a form of punishment 
regulated by penal law. The criminal conduct is non-legitimate not only because it infringes a certain 
legal order: it is intrinsically wrong because (and only if) it becomes anti-dialogical as a result. It 
requires a response not just because it is illegal, but because acquiescence to crime assumes the 
unacceptable ethical meaning of validating violence.  This principle means that the reaction to crime 
cannot assume forms which themselves violate the dialogical principle. It should avoid the self-
absolutism of the crime and also avoid imitating the violent act itself. 
The first element that the reaction to crime should incorporate is the attempt to rebalance the violation 
of mutual respect and dialogical reciprocity that the crime created: this includes the necessity to re-
empower the victim and to ask the offender to give reasons for his behaviour. This means that indeed 
the reaction to crime ought to be participatory and designed to allow a dialogue between the various 
stakeholders. 
The second element is to respect and treat the offender as a responsible and relational being including 
the dialogical dimension. A reparative approach to the reaction to crime then appears to be the most 
suitable reaction, because it neither seeks to imitate violence through retaliation, nor aims in some way 
at ‘transforming’ the offender in ways that supposedly respond to the  need for recreating a certain 
social order. In  the process of responding to a crime the situation of dialogue and mutuality should be 
restored to repair the damages caused, but also in order to ameliorate the social situation(s) that 
generated the offence(s).   
The ethical merits of this approach, I hope, will easily be recognized. But it should be noticed that 
there are strong indications in research that restorative practices, performed well, can have remarkable  
effects in preventing recidivism. The ethical choice is, in other words, also a functional one.  
The general picture rising from the empirical evaluations of effects is that there is less recidivism, that 
the time between the restorative intervention and the relapse is comparatively longer and that 
offenders relapse, when they do, into less serious forms of criminal offending (Morris and Maxwell 
2001; Sherman and Strang 2007; Shapland et al 2008).
.
Of course this type of research is full of 
methodological problems and pitfalls but one can hardly escape from the impression that treating and 
approaching people humanely and decently
29
 increases the likelihood of future norm-respecting 
conduct. Morris and Maxwell concluded with regard to juvenile offenders (in New Zealand) that 
family group conferences contribute to the lessening of future reoffending (even when other important 
intervening variables are taken into account) when young people ‘are having a conference that is 
memorable, not being made to feel a bad person, feeling involved in the conference decision-making, 
agreeing with the conference outcome, completing the tasks agreed to, feeling sorry for what they had 
done, meeting the victim and apologising to him/her, and feeling that they had repaired the 
damage.’(Morris and Maxwell 2001:261).  Strikingly, more or less the same conclusion was drawn 
with regard to adult offenders in the UK, by Shapland et al..: ‘ 
The way in which the offender had experienced the conference did relate to decreased 
subsequent offending. In  particular, the extent to which the offenders felt the conference had 
made them realise the harm done; whether the offender wanted to meet the victim; the extent 
to which the offender was observed to be actively involved in the conference; and how useful 
offenders felt the conference had been, were all significantly and positively related to 
decreased subsequent reconviction.’ 
 A possible theoretical interpretation is also given for this phenomenon:  
‘(…) the value of restorative justice conferences in promoting desistance in adult offenders: 
where offenders have decided to try and stop offending, a conference can increase motivation 
to desist (because of what victims and supporters said) and provide the support offenders may 
need to help tackle problems to their offending.’(Shapland et al 2008: iv) 
In their research synthesis of police-led conferencing Sherman and Strang (2007) mentioned three 
examples of conferencing projects that appeared to deliver counterproductive results. The three 
                                                     
29 Decency implies here above all the avoidance of a merely instrumental approach that does not see nor value 
the equal human being in the offender, an equal with legitimate desires and wishes. The Dutch legal scholar 
Pompe (1928) warned in this respect that the personality (of the offender like every other) is full of secrets, ‘one 
can only guess about, with very little chance of guessing right and much danger of arbitrariness’. See W.P.I. 
Pompe (1928),  De persoon des daders in het strafrecht, Nijmegen, Dekker & Van de Vegt, Utrecht/Nijmegen, p. 
3. My translation, jrb.   
examples all are characterized by a (context of) communication of disrespect, not only for offences, 
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